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Explaining low economic return on 
road investments. New evidence 
from Norway1 
 
Is regional policy to blame for the negative economic return on many road projects, or 
can road investments give value for money also in remote areas? In Norway, a large 
majority of planned road projects have negative net present value according to cost-
benefit analysis (CBA). In this paper, we point at geographic characteristics that can 
explain this, comparing Norway with its neighbors Sweden and Denmark. We then show 
econometric evidence that such factors also explain a substantial part of the variation in 
the benefit-cost ratio within Norway. Projects in areas that are far from the largest cities 
or have difficult topography have lower net present value. This implies that there is a 
trade-off between economic efficiency and investing in roads in rural areas with difficult 
topography. We also discuss the role of road design requirements, decision-making 
processes and the electoral system for road investment policy. 
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1 Introduction 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is used in many countries as input to decision-making 
about investments in transportation, but the outcomes of these decisions often differ 
significantly from recommendations based on CBA. This suggests that choosing 
projects based on the net benefit-cost ratio (BCR) conflicts with other goals for 
transport policy, but the tradeoff between the BCR and such other concerns is 
seldom made explicit. Instead, the arguments made in favor of investing in a project 
are often project-specific (Mackie et al 2014) and not comparable across projects. 
In this paper, we shed more light on the dilemmas that policy-makers face by 
identifying which characteristics of road projects contribute to low BCRs. Our 
country of interest is Norway, where a large share of national road and transportation 
projects have negative estimated net benefits (BCR < 0). At the same time, public 
investments in transportation are higher than in most other Western countries 
(OECD 2018). This might explain why Norwegian policy-makers question the 
relevance of CBA for transportation policy (Nyborg 1998). 
Our paper is related to the growing literature on whether the results of cost-benefit 
analysis matter for project selection (McFadden 1976, Nilsson 1991, Odeck 1996, 
Fridstrøm and Elvik 1997, Odeck 2010, Eliasson et al. 2015). However, while these 
studies are concerned with whether the BCR affects decisions, we investigate 
whether the BCR varies so much in the first place, and why so many projects have a 
low BCR. 
Low net benefits of road projects in Norway can be the result both of unfavorable 
characteristics of the country and the characteristics of the projects in terms of 
design and implementation. We have gathered statistics showing that the conditions 
are indeed unfavorable. Compared to its neighbors Sweden and Denmark, Norway 
has lower population density and more difficult topography. This implies lower net 
benefits from road investments, ceteris paribus. Norway also has a dispersed 
population and a large network of public roads to which investments are allocated. 
We also conduct a brief review of current requirements for road design in the three 
countries. This shows some examples of stricter requirements in Norway, but we 
cannot conclude that this results in higher construction costs. The construction cost 
index shows a similar development in Norway and Denmark. 
Our main contribution is an analysis revealing what geographic factors impact the 
BCR of individual road projects. Since Norway is large in area and diverse in terms of 
geographic characteristics, Norwegian data are highly suitable for this purpose. Our 
data consist of 267 and 220 projects that were candidates for the ten-year national 
investment plan in 2010 and 2014, respectively. We combine this with geographic 
characteristics measured at the municipality level, including topography, climate and 
to what extent the road is adjacent to a densely populated, central area. 
The results are consistent across the two datasets and show that such characteristics 
do impact the estimated BCR of a road project. The effects go in the expected 
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directions and are also quantitatively important. This implies that there is indeed a 
trade-off between economic efficiency and investing in many rural and remote areas, 
at least given current practice with respect to planning and road design.  
Furthermore, we discuss the impact of characteristics of the decision-making 
processes and the electoral system on Norwegian transport policies. Bottom-up 
decision-making, equity concerns in the distribution of investment and low emphasis 
on measured performance could all contribute to less emphasis on CBA in planning 
and selection of road projects. 
We also point out a misrepresentation of the Norwegian electoral system in the 
existing literature and public debate. In Norway, several rural districts are over-
represented in Parliament in terms of seats per vote. However, after adjustment seats 
were introduced in 1989, these districts are not more decisive for the electoral results 
and therefore not ‘worth more’ to the parties running for election. In fact, data on 
highway investments per district show that the over-represented districts have 
received lower investments after adjustment seats were introduced, suggesting that 
they have lost their strategic advantage.  
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we compare Norway, Sweden and 
Denmark in terms of geographic characteristics and review the requirements for road 
design. Section 3 contains our empirical analysis of how geographic characteristics 
determine the BCRs of individual road projects. In section 4 we discuss the role of 
Norwegian institutions in road planning and project selection. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Norway in a comparative perspective 
In this section, we compare Norway with its Scandinavian neighbors Sweden and 
Denmark. While these countries share many similarities with respect to culture and 
institutions, they are geographically quite different, as shown in section 2.1. In light 
of this, we discuss the role of differences in road design requirements for 
construction costs and economic efficiency in section 2.2. 
 
2.1 Country characteristics 
Table 1 shows some key statistics for the three countries that may have a bearing on 
the return on road investments. In particular, we note the following: 
• Population density and kilometers travelled per road kilometer are lower in 
Norway, which imply lower traffic volumes and hence lower benefits from 
road investments. 
• Norway has more mountains, a longer and more furrowed coastline and a 
colder climate, which could imply higher construction costs. 
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• GDP per capita is higher in Norway, something which might imply higher 
willingness to pay for transport improvements (Börjesson et al. 2012). It 
could also explain why traffic volumes per inhabitant are slightly higher. 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of Norway, Sweden and Denmark 
 
Norway Sweden Denmark 
Area (km2) 324 000 447 000 43 000 
Area > 900 m above sea level 20,5 %  0 % 
Mountains > 2000 m above sea level ≈ 300 11 0 
Coastline (km) 53 000 26 000 5000 
Mean annual temperature in capital 5,7 °C 6,6 °C 8,0 °C 
Population per km2 17,3 24,5 133,8 
GDP per capita (NOK 2016) 595 291 494 735 498 757 
Public roads (km) 94 000 148 000 75 000 
km travelled per inhabitant 13 000 12 000 12 000 
km traveled per road km 0,74 mill. 0,83 mill. 0,91 mill. 
Sources: Statistisk sentralbyrå, Statistiska centralbyrån, Danmarks statistik, Statens vegvesen, Trafikverket, 
Vejdirektoratet, Nordisk statistikkbank, Eurostat, OECD, World Resources Institute, Svenska turistföreningen, 
www.nfo200m.no 
 
With the exception of GDP per capita, all factors point towards lower return on road 
investments in Norway. Furthermore, higher income also implies higher labor costs, 
which could drive up construction costs, as seen in the next section. 
One factor that is not covered here is the quality of existing roads and other 
transport infrastructure. If this is lower in Norway, it could imply higher return on 
new investments. However, road investments have been high in Norway at least for 
the last decade, which could result in decreasing returns. 
 
2.2 Road design and construction costs 
To what extent unfavorable geographic characteristics result in low return on road 
investments depends on the requirements for and practice concerning road design. 
We have conducted a brief review of road design requirements in the three countries. 
(See Halse and Fridstrøm 2018 for details.) This shows the following: 
• The requirements for stopping sight distance are stricter in Norway. 
• The requirements for highway lighting are less strict in Norway. 
• Traffic volumes (AADT numbers) play a more important role in determining 
the type of road to be built in Norway. 
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To sum up, there is no clear evidence that requirements are stricter in Norway. 
However, the finding that AADT numbers play a more prominent role in Norway is 
interesting. For instance, ADT = 12 000 is normally required to build a four-lane 
divided highway.  
From an economic point of view, AADT limits could be used as a rule-of-thumb, 
but they should not be decisive. Whether the type of road fits the local traffic 
situation should be captured by the CBA, without additional constraints. In fact, the 
Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA) recently announced that they 
would lower the AADT required for four-lane divided highways.2 
There has been increasing debate about road type and road design after the 
government established the state enterprise Nye Veier AS, which is now responsible 
for road construction and maintenance on selected highway corridors. The policy of 
Nye Veier is to build four-lane divided highways to a larger extent, but to cut costs 
by reducing the standard (without violating the requirements), innovative contracts 
and close co-operation with local governments. A report by McKinsey written for 
Nye Veier shows that different practices with respect to project implementation and 
road design partly explain why construction costs are higher in Norway. However, 
this report is not publicly available. 
Another important factor is the general price level. Figure 1 shows changes over time 
in Norway and Demark in construction costs (left panel) and GDP per capita (right 
panel). Over the whole period, construction costs have increased about 30 percent 
more in Norway. This is almost the same as the difference in the increase in GDP 
per capita. This implies that the direct positive impact of higher income on the 
benefits of road investment (through higher willingness-to-pay) is netted out by 
higher costs. 
 
                                                 
2 VG, December 14, 2018: «Vegvesenet åpner for flere motorveier i Norge – 2000 kilometer vei er aktuell for 
utbygging.» 
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Figure 1. Construction costs and income level in Norway and Denmark. 
 
3 Evidence from Norwegian road projects 
In this section, we show how the economic return on Norwegian road projects 
depends on the characteristics of the area in which they are located, and discuss the 
implications for transport policy. 
 
3.1 Data and identification strategy 
We use data on projects that were candidates for being included in the national 
transport plans for 2010-2019 and 2014-2023. This data set contains 267 and 220 
projects, respectively. We do not combine the two data sets, since some projects 
appear in both data sets under different names. 
Our purpose is to identify how the geographic characteristics of an area affect the 
costs and benefits of road projects in that area. However, estimated costs and 
benefits (in monetary terms) also reflect the scale and scope of a project – larger or 
more ambitious projects typically have both higher costs and higher benefits. Since 
we do not have an objective measure of scale or scope, we instead focus on relative 
net benefits, measured by the net benefit-cost ratio (BCR): 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 − 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖  
where 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 are the ‘benefits’ of the project, both positive and negative, and 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 is 
construction cost. We follow Norwegian practice and use net benefits in the 
numerator (cf. Minken, 2016). However, we depart from standard practice and use 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 
as the denominator instead of budget cost. This is because we are not interested in 
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the variation in the BCR that reflects differences in the funding scheme.3 Appendix 
Figure 3 shows how the outcome variable is distributed across projects. 
We estimate a simple linear regression model using this as the outcome variable and 
geographic characteristics 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖 as explanatory variables: 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝜷𝜷𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
Hence, we can assess whether a certain characteristic influences the BCR, but not 
whether this effect comes through benefits or costs (or both). We expect some 
characteristics to mainly affect the benefit side and others to mainly affect the cost 
side (see next section). 
The identifying assumption is that there are no unobserved project characteristics 
that are correlated with both 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖 and 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖. To evaluate the robustness of our results, 
we compare models with and without additional control variables: Dummies for the 
five road regions and dummies for the planning stage of the project. 
 
3.2 Explanatory variables 
We combine this data with data on geographic characteristics that might influence 
the net return on road investments, more precisely characteristics of the municipality in 
which each project is located.4 Since Norway has relatively many municipalities, this 
gives large variation and fairly precise information. An alternative would be to use 
GIS data with a higher resolution, but this would also require assumptions about 
which parts of an area explain the net return on a road investment located in it. 
The municipality characteristics are: 
• Altitude difference: Measured in 100 meters. Difference between the highest 
and the lowest altitude interval, based on area statistics from Statistics 
Norway. For instance, if a municipality has some area in the interval 0-60 m 
above sea level (MASL) and some in the interval 900-1199 MASL, this 
variable takes the value 9 (900 meters). 
• Coastal area: A dummy equal to one if the municipality has some coastline, 
zero otherwise. 
• Island share: The share (from 0 to 1) of the coastline that is part of an island. 
(If no coastline, this variable is equal to zero.) 
• Temperature: Measured in degrees Celsius. Average temperature, from 
statistics gathered by Andersen et al. (2014). 
• Precipitation: Measured in 1000 millimeters. Annual precipitation, from the 
same source. 
                                                 
3 Replacing our outcome variable with BCR based on budget cost as the denominator gives similar 
results, but slightly lower precision and model fit (Halse and Fridstrøm 2018). 
4 If more municipalities are listed in the database, we use the first one. In some cases, no municipality 
is listed. In this case, we use the municipality to which most of the project belongs. 
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• Centrality: The centrality index (from 0 to 1) from Statistics Norway 
(Høydahl 2017).5 
• Population density: Measured in 1000 inhabitants per square kilometer  
• Income: Measured in 100 000 NOK. Median household income after taxes, 
in the relevant year (2010 or 2014, respectively). 
The advantage of the centrality index is that it captures not only whether the 
municipality itself is a major city or a densely populated area, but also whether it is 
close to such areas. This is important because a large share of the traffic generating 
benefits from a road projects could be traffic passing through the municipality. 
We also include population density, because building in more populated areas could 
be more expensive and therefore give lower net benefits (other things equal). 
Appendix Figure 4 shows that centrality and population density is correlated, but this 
correlation is driven by the 10-15 most central municipalities in our data. And also 
among these, population density varies substantially.  
 
3.3 Results 
The regression results are shown in Table 1. The results are quite stable across the 
two national transport plans (columns 1-3 and 4-6, respectively) and different model 
specifications. The following conclusions can be made: 
• Projects in areas with large differences in altitude have lower BCRs. An 
increase in altitude differences of 100 meters is associated with a decrease in 
the BCR of about 0.03-0.05 (keeping other characteristics constant). 
• Projects along the coast have lower BCRs. The difference is about 0.22-0.40. 
• Projects in areas with higher temperature have higher BCRs. One degree 
Celsius higher temperature is associated with an increase in the BCR of about 
0.04-0.08. 
• Projects in more central areas have higher BCRs. An increase in the centrality 
index of 0.1 is associated with an increase in the BCR of about 0.15-0.24. 
All these findings are in line with our expectations. There is also some evidence that 
population density negatively affects the BCR, but this effect is only statistically 
significant in the dataset from the NTP for 2014-2023. The effect of islands is also 
negative in all specifications, but never statistically significant. 
The effect of precipitation, which we would expect to be negative, differs between 
specifications and is in most cases not statistically significant. The same goes for the 
effect of the income level. This might not be surprising, since the unit values used in 
CBA are national values that do not reflect regional differences in willingness to pay 
(Østli et al. 2012). However, regional differences in income could still affect the 
traffic volumes.  
 
                                                 
5 The original index goes from 1 to 1000, but we divide the variable by 1000. 
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Table 2. The relationship between the benefit cost ratio (BCR) and geographic characteristics 
 NTP 2010-2019 NTP 2014-2023 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Altitude diff. -0.028*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.036*** -0.051*** -0.047*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
       
Coastal area -0.219* -0.368*** -0.368*** -0.216* -0.401*** -0.398*** 
 (0.115) (0.134) (0.134) (0.118) (0.140) (0.141) 
       
Island share -0.110 -0.094 -0.061 -0.090 -0.113 -0.110 
 (0.209) (0.224) (0.220) (0.226) (0.234) (0.233) 
       
Temperature 0.064*** 0.075*** 0.074** 0.040* 0.061** 0.062** 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.029) (0.021) (0.025) (0.025) 
       
Precipitation 0.024 -0.083 -0.096 0.387*** 0.193 0.195 
 (0.087) (0.085) (0.086) (0.119) (0.132) (0.133) 
       
Centrality 1.547*** 2.052*** 1.948*** 1.487*** 2.327*** 2.385*** 
 (0.430) (0.559) (0.502) (0.431) (0.518) (0.508) 
       
Pop. density -0.208 -0.387 -0.374 -0.496*** -0.732*** -0.702*** 
 (0.251) (0.250) (0.247) (0.133) (0.149) (0.158) 
       
Median income 0.134 -0.136 -0.108 0.015 -0.252* -0.217 
 (0.174) (0.231) (0.225) (0.112) (0.151) (0.153) 
Observations 267 267 267 219 219 219 
R-squared 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.28 0.32 0.32 
Region fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Planning stage controls No No Yes No No Yes 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation. 
 
3.4 Implications 
The results clearly suggest that there is a tradeoff between choosing road projects 
based on economic net benefits and investing in areas with certain characteristics. In 
Norway, centrality is positively correlated with temperature and negatively correlated 
with altitude differences. Hence, prioritizing based on the BCR would imply 
investing more in central areas, with the possible exception of some very central 
areas with high population density. 
To illustrate the implications, we show how the distribution of investments and 
economic benefits would have been if all projects with BCR > 0 had been 
implemented. The distributional impact is illustrated by dividing the population into 
five percentiles (quintiles) based on (1) centrality and (2) income. 
The distribution of investments with respect to centrality is shown in the left panels 
of Figure 1. As we can see, choosing projects with positive BCRs imply low 
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investments both in the most central areas6 (which have high population density) and 
least central areas. In the NTP for 2010, those in the 3rd centrality quintile would 
receive the highest investment. In 2014-2023, those in the 2nd quintile would receive 
the most, followed by those in the 3rd. (As there are more large projects with positive 
BCR in the NTP for 2014-2023, total investments are higher in the middle panel.) 
Due to positive correlation between centrality and BCR also within those projects 
that have BCR > 0, benefits (right panels) are somewhat more centralized than 
investments. 
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of road projects by centrality quintile (1-5). Note: ‘Actual selection’ refers to the 
recommendations to the government by the transport authorities (cf. Eliasson et al, 2015), which is not 
necessarily the same as the projects eventually appearing in the National Transport Plan. 
 
Although this distribution does not dramatically favor central areas, it clearly 
contrasts with actual policy. The bottom panel shows the distribution proposed by 
the transport agencies in the planning stage of the NTP for 2014-2023 (the outcome 
                                                 
6 The 5th quintile includes those living in Oslo, six neighboring municipalities, and Drammen. 
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studied by Eliasson et al. 2015). In this distribution, those in the 1st quintile receive 
the highest investments. We do not have data on the selection of projects in the final 
plan presented to parliament, but we have no reason to believe that central areas are 
favored more there. 
Figure 2 shows a somewhat similar picture for distribution with respect to income 
level. Choosing projects with BCR > 0 would imply low investments in the poorest 
areas, and in the NTP for 2014-2023, high investments in the richest areas. This 
clearly contrasts with the distribution proposed by the transport agencies. This 
suggests that decision-makers take distributional concerns into account.7 
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of road projects by income quintile (1-5). Note: ‘Actual selection’ refers to the 
recommendations to the government by the transport authorities (cf. Eliasson et al. 2015), which is not 
necessarily the same as the projects eventually appearing in the National Transport plan presented to 
parliament. 
 
                                                 
7 According to the results in section 3.3, the relationship with income level might not reflect income in 
itself, but characteristics correlated with income, like altitude differences and temperature. 
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4 The role of institutions 
In Norway, there are many road projects with low net benefits, both among projects 
in the planning stage and those that have been implemented. When CBA results do 
not matter in the final selection of projects, this could result in less emphasis on 
economic return also in earlier stages (Eliasson and Lundberg 2012, Mackie et al. 
2014). Alternatively, it could be that the same factors that result in low emphasis on 
economic return in the final selection also influence planning practices. 
In any case, institutional features are likely to be important. In this chapter, we 
discuss how administrative institutions (section 4.1) and electoral institutions (section 
4.2) could influence how CBA is used in decision-making. 
 
4.1 Administrative institutions 
One issue commonly addressed is that national road projects often have a long 
history that involves initiatives from local interests (Haanes 2006, Strand 2015, Sager 
2016). This means that the expectations about and support for a project could be 
high before precise estimates of costs and benefits are available, giving projects with 
low net benefits enough momentum to eventually be implemented. To what extent 
this happens to a larger extent in Norway is an open question. 
There is also some evidence indicating that decision-makers prefer an even/and or 
stable distribution of investments across geographic areas. Strand (1983, 1993) and 
Ravlum and Sørensen (2005) find that the distribution of investment across counties 
has been relatively stable over time. Fridstrøm and Elvik (1997) find that two 
projects are less likely to be selected if they are located in the same municipality. 
One feature that might be characteristic for Norway is the administrative culture or 
tradition. According to Christensen et al. (2002), Norway differs from its neighbor 
Sweden in two respects: 
1. In Norway, each minister answers to the Parliament for decisions within his 
or her sector, while in Sweden, the whole cabinet is responsible. This could 
result in decision-making being more fragmented and less top-down. 
2. Sweden has a more ‘rationalistic’ administrative culture with more tradition 
for measuring and evaluating the quality of publicly provided goods and 
services. (See also Olson and Sahlin-Andersson 1998.)  
This feature is not specific to the transport sector, but it could be a part of the 
explanation why CBA seems to be less important for decisions in Norway than in 
Sweden (Eliasson et al. 2015). 
 
4.2 Electoral institutions 
Building new infrastructure is a visible form of public investment. Several studies 
show that the geographic allocation of such investments is affected by the strategic 
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interests of politicians in office or running for election (Elvik 1996, Knight 2004, 
Knight 2008, Helland and Sørensen 2009, Halse 2016, Hammes and Nilsson 2016). 
Can this also explain the allocation of road investments to less populated areas in 
Norway? 
One particular feature of the Norwegian electoral system that has caught attention is 
the relatively large differences in parliamentary representation between electoral 
districts (counties). While the capital Oslo has more than 24,000 voters per seat in 
Parliament, the far north county of Finnmark has less than 11,000. 
If all MPs were elected based on district votes, this would have implied that a vote 
cast in Finnmark or another over-represented district would be more decisive for the 
party composition in Parliament. This again would have given parties incentives to 
allocate (or promise to allocate) more public investments to the over-represented 
districts in order to win the next election. 
However, since 1989, some of the seats in Parliament are so-called adjustment seats.8 
These seats were introduced to ensure that the party composition reflects the popular 
vote. If a party is ‘unlucky’ and loses a seat in several districts by a close margin, it 
will instead be granted adjustment seats, provided that it has more than four percent 
support on the national level. According to Aardal (2011), this implies that 
differences in district representation have virtually no impact on party composition. 
Hence, parties now have no incentive to favor a particular district in order to win the 
election. If such incentives are important, we would expect over-represented districts 
do receive lower investments after 1989. Using the data from Helland and Sørensen 
(2009), Figure 4 shows that this is also the case, at least up until year 2000.  (The 
relationship with over-representation in each district is shown in appendix Figure 7.) 
However, we cannot conclude that this is the explanation. 
Over-represented districts still have the advantage that they have more 
representatives that can act as their spokesmen in Parliament, giving more bargaining 
power (Knight 2008). This is however something different than the electoral 
incentives of parties. The importance of adjustment seats for this seems to have gone 
un-noticed in the discussions of Hansen and Jørgensen (2015) and Sager (2016) of 
the Norwegian system and in the comparative study of proportional election systems 
by Kedar et al. (2015). 
In general, proportional election systems are expected to give less room for 
geographic special interests and deliver more welfare services for the broader 
population than systems with single-member districts (Persson and Tabellini 1999, 
Lizzeri and Persico 2001, Milesi-Ferreti et al. 2002, Stratmann and Baur 2002, 
Gagliarducci et al. 2011, Funk and Gathmann 2011). This should also be kept in 
mind when discussing the role of the electoral system in transport politics in Norway. 
                                                 
8 In the elctions from 1989 to 2001, there were eight adjustment seats. Since 2005, there has been 19, 
one for each district (county). 
  14 
 
Figure 4. National road investments over time in districts that are under- and over-represented in Parliament. 
 
5 Conclusion 
Our study shows that allocating road investments based only on economic return 
could conflict with equity concerns with respect to geography and possibly also 
income. If such concerns are taken into account in decision-making, this could 
explain why so many road projects showing low economic return are planned and 
eventually carried out. 
The economic textbook solution would be to choose the projects yielding the highest 
value for money, and then use other policies to compensate those not benefitting. 
This raises the question about whether such other policies exist in practice. More 
research should be done on the effectiveness of different policy measures for 
regional redistribution. 
Even if distributional concerns are legitimate, the fact that these concerns are not 
transparent in the assessment and selection of projects is problematic. A possible 
solution would be to quantify to what extent a project gives benefits to an area that 
for instance is far from the largest cities, has low population growth or low income. 
This would also enable planners to identify projects that neither give positive 
economic return nor stimulate development in disadvantaged areas. 
Distributional concerns have received relatively little attention in the transport 
economics literature compared to other fields of economics. Given the challenges 
that economic inequality poses to the economy and the political system (see e.g. 
Fetzer 2018), these issues should be taken seriously also by those who favor cost-
effectiveness in public decision-making. 
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The focus of this paper has been on factors that explain low economic return on 
road projects as shown in the CBA conducted in the planning phase. If costs are 
under-estimated at this stage (Welde and Odeck 2017), net benefits will be even 
lower when the project is implemented. Some projects also end up giving lower 
benefits due to user charges. Although our results are robust to controlling for 
planning stage, this also calls for more studies based on ex-post CBA. 
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Appendix: Supplementary figures 
 
Figure 5. The distribution of the benefit-cost ratio among road projects in our data. 
 
 
Figure 6. The relationship between the population density and centrality level of municipalities in our data. 
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Figure 7. Central government road funding in the electoral district vs. overrepresentation in Parliament in 
1964-1989 and 1990-2000, not including user charges and regional co-financing. 
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